International Lawyer
Volume 18

Number 4

Article 8

1984

Federal Republic of Germany and the EEC
Axel Heck

Recommended Citation
Axel Heck, Federal Republic of Germany and the EEC, 18 INT'L L. 793 (1984)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol18/iss4/8

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more
information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

AXEL HECK*

Federal Republic of Germany
and the EEC
"Litigation in the United States is a horror show", the man said, not
looking very happy, "they put you through this ordeal they call 'pretrial
discovery'; and on top of it, you don't get those prohibitive attorneys' fees
reimbursed, even if you win... ! So, don't ever sue in the United States,"
he resumed, "and if you ever get sued, settle ... !" If someone asked me to
reveal the source of this statement, I would not have to claim any clientattorney privilege; I would make full disclosure, pointing to an entire
species: foreign clients.
There is, of course, the other side; the American lawyer who, when
confronted, for example, with the fact that U.S.-style pretrial discovery for
all practical purposes does not exist elsewhere, would utter in total
disbelief: "How can there ever be justice in those countries ...
I. Discovery Abroad
A.

GERMANY AND U.S. CONTRASTED

The conceptual difference regarding discovery that exists between the
United States and, I dare say, the rest of the world can be epitomized by
contrasting the following statements of the U.S. Supreme Court and German Supreme Court; each, it should be noted, was made in a purely
domestic context. The purpose of pre-trial discovery, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held, is to "make a trial less a game of a blind man's buff and more
a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent." 1 In contrast, the German Supreme Court has held that "a
*LL.M., Columbia Law School, 1977; J.D., Cologne Law School, 1973. Member of the New
York and German bars.
1. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677,683 (1958). See also FED. R. Civ. P.

26(b)(1), which reads in pertinent part: ". . .It isnot ground for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence..." (emphasis added).
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party is not required to help its opponent to victory by making available
material that [the opponent] does not have at its disposal already." 2
Accordingly, German courts do not entertain requests for the taking of
evidence without the party making such a request having laid a proper
foundation that the facts to be proven are not taken "out of the blue" but
rather suggest a certain degree of certainty; in other words and in diametrical contrast to, for example, Federal Rule Civil Procedure 26, German
courts will not grant a motion for the taking of evidence that is not directed
at proving plausible facts, but rather is designed to produce such facts.
Furthermore, production of documents, the heart of pretrial discovery in
the United States, does not exist in civil litigation in Germany. All this is
designed to protect both third-party witnesses and opponents from what
German law would consider unreasonable intrusions into a person's constitutionally guaranteed sphere of personal freedom.
B.

CIVIL LITIGATION IN GERMANY

3

Typical for civil law systems, the conduct of civil litigation in Germany is
controlled by the court; there are no juries. It is for the parties to decide
what factual circumstances they want to bring before the court. Thereafter,
the court takes over; and, while it will use its authority to help the parties
prove the facts they have alleged, the court will not assist in procuring those
facts.
Litigation starts with the filing of a complaint. In contrast to American
practice, however, in German civil litigation a complaint should be conclusive as to the factual circumstances alleged in support of the relief sought. If
it does not stand on its own feet (that is, if the facts, assuming they are true,
do not carry the case presented), the court, on its own motion, will dismiss
the complaint. Thus, in such a situation, the defendant does not even have to
answer; there will be no default judgment against him.
A complaint also must proffer proof for the facts alleged; typically, this is
done by identifying witnesses and by attaching relevant documents. The
same applies to the defendant's answer. Thereafter, the court will discuss
the case with the parties (and their attorneys) in what is called oralargument; it being the court's statutory duty to see to it that the parties make
full statements regarding all material facts, make the appropriate motions,
and indicate means of proof. And while the parties are free to choose what

2. Author's translation from BGH, NJW 1964, 1414.
3. Obviously, only a brief overview of German law can be given here. For a more elaborate,
if somewhat outdated, analysis, see Kaplan, von Mehren, Schaefer, Phases of German Civil
Procedure, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1193; 1443 (1958). See also Kutschelis, The Legal System, in
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY (B. Rster, ed., 1983).
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factual circumstances they want to bring before the court, those facts have to
be complete and in accordance with the truth.
After the court has discharged its so-called duty of clarification, it determines which material facts remain disputed, who has the burden of proof,
and whether that party has proffered any proof. It is on this basis that the
court then decides whether to summon witnesses or to appoint an expert;
only under very limited circumstances can the court order the production of
documents by the opponent or third-parties.
At the evidence hearing, the court first examines the witness to establish
that he or she has sufficient general knowledge of the facts as to which it shall
testify. (Incidentally, parties are not qualified to testify as witnesses; this
rule is based on the notion that parties cannot be expected to be impartial to
their own case). If the court is satisfied the witness is sufficiently knowledgeable, it will proceed to ask such specific questions as it deems necessary to
fulfill its duty to find the truth. After the court has completed its questioning,
counsel for the parties have, under the court's supervision, the right to
question the witness, but only on the matters set forth in the order by which
the court had summoned the witness. There is no cross-examination. The
witness' statements are not transcribed verbatim; rather, a summary is
dictated by the judge at certain intervals during testimony. Thus, in contrast
to litigation in the United States, a German plaintiff has to be fairly certain
that he has a case and the necessary evidence before he goes to court.
Otherwise, he will not only loose his case, but will also have to reimburse his
opponent's legal fees, which is the rule in most foreign countries.
C.

HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION

Against this background, the Hague Evidence Convention 4 constitutes a
remarkable concession by civil law countries, such as Germany, to the desire
of the United States to have U.S. style discovery executed and enforced
abroad. The following addresses certain problem areas concerning the
5
Convention's scope and applicdition.

4. Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, done
March 18, 1970.
5. See also, e.g., Message from the President to the Senate, reprintedat 12 I.L.M. 323 (1972),
also containing the Secretary of State's Letter of Submittal, id. at 324-26, and the official
explanatory report of the Hague Rapporteur, id. at 327-42 (hereinafter cited as the "Message
from the President"); Reports of the Work of the Special Commission on the Operation of the
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters,
reprinted at 17 I.L.M. 1417 (1978) (hereinafter cited as the "1978 Report"); Augustine,
Obtaining InternationalJudicialAssistance underthe FederalRules and the Hague Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters: An Exposition of Procedures and a PracticalExample: In re Westinghouse Uranium ContractLitigation 10 GA. J. INT'L
& CoMP. L. 101 (1980).
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1. Preemptive Effect
In contrast to the rather confusing situation in the United States, there is
no question that, under German treaty law, the Hague Evidence Convention takes precedent over any conflicting rules of German civil procedure.
The district court in Munich held the following in the sole case to this date
resulting from requests made by American courts under the Convention:
The provisions of [the German Code of Civil Procedure] apply only to the extent
the [Hague Evidence Convention], which as the more pertinent and recent law
takes precedence6 over the [German Code of Civil Procedure], does not require a
different result.

The majority of the (lower) courts in the United States that to date had an
opportunity to address the issue of the Hague Evidence Convention, however, has taken the position that the Convention is not preemptive, but
rather only the primary vehicle that must be used when discovery is to be had
abroad; thus, American law on the subject of discovery abroad is left fully
intact.7 The reasons typically advanced in support of this position are the
fact that the Convention does not state that it is exclusive, that its Article 27
provides that a contracting state remains free to maintain or introduce
procedures that are more liberal than those provided in the Convention and
that, moreover, American officials have stated that the Convention does not
require the United States to change its laws.8
The logic of this reasoning is not apparent for these facts prove the exact
opposite of what these courts inferred from them. It is precisely for the
reason that the Convention does have the preemptive power of a treaty that
Article 27 had to be incorporated therein. 9 Otherwise, it would have superseded those national laws that already provide for more liberal procedures
than are mandated by the Convention as, for example, the United States has
in 28 U.S.C. § 1782. Moreover, without a provision like Article 27, unilateral introduction of more liberal procedures, under the various treaty laws
of the respective contracting states, might not be possible without amending
the Convention. The purpose of the Convention, therefore, is to set mini-

6. Author's translation from LG Minchen I, ZZP 1982, 363. (A descriptive account of that
case is provided by Platto, Taking Evidence Abroadfor use in Civil Cases in the United States-A
Practical Guide, 16 INT'L LAW. 575, 581 (1982).
7. See, e.g., Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc. et al., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. I11.
1984) (hereinafter
cited as "Graco"); Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa.
1983)(hereinafter cited as "Lasky"); Compagnie Frangaise d'Assurance pour le Commerce
Extdrieur et al. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 81 Civ. 4463-CLB (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 24, 1983)
(hereinafter cited as "Coface"); Pierburg GmbH & Co. v. Superior Court, 186 CAL. RPrR. 876,
137 Cal. App. 3d 236 (1982) (hereinafter cited as "Pierburg").
8. Id.
9. See also, e.g., Cuisinart, Inc. v. Robot Coupe, S.A. et al., D.N. CV 80 0050083 S (Super.
Ct. Stamford/Norwalk Jud. Dist., July 22, 1982) (hereinafter cited as "Cuisinart").
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mum standards, thus permitting a contracting state to maintain more liberal
standards, or to introduce them in the future.10
Another confusing element that can be found in these cases is that
although they acknowledge the treaty status of the Convention, they still

apply principles of comity. In a treaty context, however, there is no need to
resort to such principles; they have been absorbed by the treaty, which
constitutes a binding contract between and among sovereign nations.
Finally, it is interesting to note that as regards the Hague Convention on
Service of Process Abroad,'1 which has a treaty structure that, mutatis
mutandis, is identical with that of the Evidence Convention, there is a
plethora of American cases that unequivocally acknowledge its treaty and,
therefore, preemptive status. 12 The fact that the Hague Evidence Conven-

tion, in effect, might limit the power American courts would otherwise
have, particularly when they have personal jurisdiction, surely does not
justify breaching a treaty and thereby violating the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.13
2. Discovery of Documents

A real problem exists, however, as regards the issue of discovery of
documents. Most contracting states have made use of Article 23, which
provides in pertinent part: "A Contracting State may ... declare that it will
not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial
discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries."1 4 As a result,
Germany, for example, does not execute requests for production of
documents.' 5 It appears, however, that this categorical refusal by civil law

countries like Germany to execute requests for document production is
10. See, e.g., Message from The President, id. at 324, 326, 342. See also Cuisinart, id. at 6;
Report of the United States Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, reprinted at 8 I.L.M. 804, 818 (1969) (hereinafter cited as the "1969
Report").
11. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
Civil and Commercial Matters, done Nov. 15, 1965.
12. See cases cited in U.S. Brief submitted to the Supreme Court in response to the Court's
invitation in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Falzon, reprinted at 23 I.L.M. 412, 414
(1984), appeal dismissed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3609, rehearing denied 52 U.S.L.W. 3857. (1984)
(hereinafter cited as "Solicitor General").
13. See also Solicitor General, id. at note 3.
14. The Declarations and Reservations made by the Contracting States are reprinted
together with the text of the Convention at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781.
15. Given the Declaration made by the German government under Article 23 and the clear
mandate of Section 14, para. 1, of the German Law of December 22, 1977, implementing the
Convention, the Munich Court of Appeals in the above reported case had no choice but to deny
the request for production of documents made by the American court. Section 14, para. 1,
provides: "Letters of Request for a proceeding under Article 23... will not be executed." See
also Platto, supra note 6 (but note that the German court did permit the taking of testimony
regarding the content of the documents requested).
FALL 1984
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largely attributable to the lack of knowledge
these countries have of the
16

concept of litigation in the United States.
To a European lawyer the term "pre-trial" suggests a.degree of detachment from the actual case that does not correspond with the realities of
litigation in the United States. German civil procedure, for example, does
not distinguish between a pre-trial and a trial phase; rather oral argument,
although it often requires several sessions including special ones for the
taking of evidence, is regarded as a continuum.

17

This contrasts with the

precepts of litigation in the United States, where pre-trial discovery of
documents forms part of pre-trial discovery and, accordingly, is a conditio
sine qua non for the trial itself.

While I do not foresee that, in the future, civil law countries would agree
to execute just any request for production of documents, I do believe that,
for example, the German ordre public would permit the execution of requests that stay within reasonable limits. ' 8 The standard suggested for the
revision of Section 40 Restatement (Second) of the ForeignRelations Law of
the United States may serve as a yardstick; it proposes that discovery pro-

ceedings directed at documents, information, and persons located abroad
be ordered by a court and be "directly relevant, necessary, and material to
an action or investigation."

19

3. Sanctions
Another problem area regarding the operation of the Hague Evidence

Convention is the issue of sanctions. Again, its analysis has to start with the
viewpoint of American law for, here too, the arsenal of sanctions available
to courts in the United States in cases of non-compliance with their discovery orders is unique. While, for example, a German court has the power to
fine and jail a recalcitrant witness, its authority to "punish" a party for
violation of its orders, or other infringements of the rules of civil procedure,
20
is reduced to an admission-of-fact sanction.
16. See also 1978 Report, supra note 5, at 1421-24.
17. The German Civil Code is devised to dispose of a case, including the taking of evidence,
at one session of oral-argument; reality, however, often has it different.
18. From the very narrowly drafted escape clauses, Articles 9, para. 2, and 12, it can be
inferred that only under extreme circumstances can a contracting state refuse to execute a
request properly made under the Convention. This conclusion finds further support in the fact
that, as its preamble suggests, the Convention must be construed liberally and, furthermore,
that generally accepted principles of international law require that a treaty be performed in
good faith. See, e.g., Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (opened for
signature May 23, 1969), reprinted at 8 1.L. M. 679 (1969). Note also that Section 14, para. 2, of
the German Law of December 22, 1977, implementing the Convention, provides that requests
for pretrial discovery of documents may be executed within the parameters of a still to be
devised Regulation.)
19. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES (Revised), Section 420, (Tentative Draft No. 3).
20. Since, as noted above, parties do not qualify as witnesses under German law, their
"testimony" cannot be compelled; thus, the sole risk a party runs that chooses not to answer
VOL. 18, NO. 4
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Under American law, if a court has personal jurisdiction, a foreign
context in and of itself does not affect its power to order discovery and
impose sanctions. 2' For example, as regards the most notorious form of
discovery, production of documents, location abroad as a general rule does
not impair a court's power to order disclosure; as stated, for example, by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the Marc Rich case: "The test for the
production of documents is control, not location.", 22 However, a comityrelated "balancing-of-interest" test is being applied when sanctions are
being sought in cases where compliance with a court's order has been
refused on the ground that this would violate the laws of the country where,
for example, the documents are located. 23
The crucial question in this context, therefore, is whether iatification of
the Hague Evidence Convention has changed anything in the way the issue
of sanctions has to be resolved? The quid pro quo function of the Convention (as a-treaty and, therefore, binding on ratifying nations) requires that as
requests for judicial assistance must be made in accordance with the Convention, the courts in the requested state must execute and enforce such
requests. Accordingly, the obligation to disclose, traditionally imposed on a
private person, has been superseded by the treaty obligation of the contracting states to execute and enforce such requests. In light of this shift in
responsibility, there is no reason or, indeed, legal ground left for the
imposition of sanctions; rather, in matters covered by the Convention, an
imposition of sanctions would constitute a breach of the treaty.2 4
This, of course, does not deprive the requesting court of its power to
impose proper sanctions as regards the disposition of the case, or to punish
any abusive use of the Convention like, for example, the anticipatory
removal of documents into a jurisdiction where discovery would be limited.
However, since the requested court, under the Convention, must exercise
its jurisdiction over a private person (including, under Article 10, the use of
compulsory process), the requesting court loses its power to impose sanctions regarding the same factual circumstances.
4. Blocking Statutes
Finally, the relevance of so-called "blocking" statutes in the context of the
Convention is raised, because France is, except for England, the only
questions posed by the court is that the court might consider as admitted the underlying fact
alleged by the opponent.
21. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694,699 (1982); and
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
22. Matter of Marc Rich & Co. A.G., 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1983). See also, e.g., FTC
v. SPGM, 707 F.2d 1304 (2d Cir. 1983).
23. This test was adopted in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 40, and has found broad recognition by the courts. See,
e.g., Note, ForeignNondisclosureLaws and Domestic Discovery Ordersin Antitrust Litigation,

88 YALE L.J. 612, 619-21 (1979).
24. See also Solicitor General, supra note 12, at 418.
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signatory to
the Hague Evidence Convention that has passed "blocking"
25
legislation.
Although no cases have been reported to date in which the French
"blocking" statute (passed into law on July 16, 1980, that is, after France
ratified the Convention) 26 has been invoked by the French authorities, it
appears that this legislation is neither intended nor does it affect the taking
of evidence under the Convention. This conclusion is suggested by the fact
that the French statute expressly renders itself inoperative as regards conflicting international treaties or agreements, and that it addresses requests
made by "foreign public authorities," which does not seem to encompass
requests made by foreign courts, as is the procedure under the Convention.
Thus, the conclusion follows that the French "blocking" statute is directed
27
against discovery attempts made outside the Hague Evidence Convention.
Review of American cases that to date had occasion to address this issue,
however, suggests that this aspect of the French statute is not being
observed. 28 These cases also manifest another phenomenon: the tendency
to either not engage in any independent review by the courts of issues of
29
foreign procedural aspects, or to embark on speculations about these laws,
which as, for example, Articles 9, para. 1, and 10 of the Convention
demonstrate, always have to be considered in addition to the provisions of
30
the Convention itself.
While experience shows that it is advisable for the requesting court to,
through proper sources, determine the general parameters of foreign law, it
is only the actual dialogue with the foreign authorities designated in the
Convention that can give a conclusive and authoritative answer as to what a
request for discovery in a particular contracting state can and what it cannot
achieve. As regards the heart of the Hague Evidence Convention, its Letter
of Request procedure, this can only be ascertained if the courts make use of
this procedure.

25. For a discussion of the English statute see, Lowe, Blocking ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:
The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 257 (1981).
26. See Herzog, CurrentDevelopments: The 1980 French Law on Documents and Information, 75 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 382, 384, 385 (1981); Toms, The French Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 15 INT'L LAW. 585, 593-99 (1981). (Both
articles also provide English translations of the French statute).
27. See Toms, supra note 26, at 596.
28. See, e.g., Graco, supra note 7, at 508-12; Coface, supra note 7 at 10.
29. Id.
30. American law encourages courts to independently determine issues of foreign law. SEE
FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1; see also United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 343-44
(7th Cir. 1983).
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II. Extraterritoriality in Germany and EEC
A.

EFFECTS DOCTRINE

The following is not a quotation from an American enactment; rather it is
Section 98, para. 2, of the German antitrust statute: "This Act shall apply to
all restraints of competition which have effects within the territory covered
by this Act, including restraints that result from actions taken outside such
territory." 31 Similarly, "The EEC Treaty's rules on competition apply to
restrictive or abusive practices by undertakings situated in non-member
countries where their conduct has an appreciable impact within the common
market. , 32 The so-called effects doctrine, introduced into American (antitrust) law by Judge Learned Hand's landmark opinion in the Alcoa case, 3 3 is
not at all a notion that is unique to American law. 3 4 Moreover, it is interesting to note that the European Court of Justice has developed, alongside the
effects doctrine, the concept of imputing the behavior of a subsidiary to its
parent company and, furthermore, the economic-entity theory for structured groups of companies. These concepts are being used where subsidiaries in the Common Market act upon instructions from outside the
35
Common Market.
B.

ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT

As regards the transnational procedural aspects of, for example, the
administrative enforcement of antitrust laws, however, the European
approach appears to be more conservative than what appears to be the
practice in the United States. Under, for example, German antitrust procedure, the Federal Cartel Office in Berlin cannot require the German subsid31. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen ("GWB") ["Act against Restraints of Competition"] of 1957, as amended. An English translation (with annotations) of the GWB is
provided in the OECD GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, VOI. 1. See

also COMMON MARKET REPORTER (CCH), Doing Business in Europe, para. 23,501.
32. Commission of the European Communities, Eleventh Report on Competition Policy
("Comp. Rep. EC 1981"), at 36. See also, e.g., GLEISS AND HIRSCH, COMMON MARKET CARTEL
LAW, at 16-21 (3d ed. 1981).
33. United States v. Aluminium Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945). See also
the excellent analysis of the present status of the effects doctrine and related issues under
American antitrust laws by Judge Wilkey in Laker Airways Limited v. Sabena and KLM, 731
F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984), reprinted at 23 I.L.M. 519, 527-32 (1984) (hereinafter cited as
"Laker"). (For a discussion of the impact the Alcoa case had on American antitrust and
American law in general see, ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, 356-58 (1975). See also,
Foer, InternationalImplications of Section 7, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 819, 822-24 (1981-82).)
34. See also, Steiner and D. Vagts, TRANSNATONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS at 1014-16 (2d ed.
1976); Gleiss and Hirsch, supra note 32; Rahl, Economic Imperialism or Protecting Competition against Foreign Invasion? 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 617, 632-33 (1981).
35. See e.g., Steiner and Vagts, id. at 1417-19; Gleiss and Hirsch, id. at 18; Comp. Rep. EC
1981, at 36-37.
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iary of a foreign company to provide information about, or obtain documents from, its foreign parent company, unless this is directly related to the
activities of the German subsidiary itself. 36 Furthermore, German law requires that service of process abroad must be effected through proper
foreign assistance; particularly, it does not suffice to solely serve the German subsidiary. 37
As regards the issue of transnational judicial assistance in government-

conducted antitrust investigations, i.e., administrative matters, the Hague
Evidence Convention does not apply since it only relates to civil or commercial matters. However, as between the United States and Germany, these
issues are covered by bilateral governmental agreement. 38
C. U.S. EXPORT LAWS

Finally, I should like to make some observations on the issue of the
extraterritorial application of the United States Export Administration
Laws, which figured so prominently, for example, in the Russian pipeline
controversy. 39 At issue is not so much the question whether the United
States has the right to exercise control over foreign corporations incorporated and located abroad, if the sole nexus such corporations have with the
United States is the fact that they happen to be subsidiaries of American
parent companies and/or are using technology that has been licensed to
them by American licensors. For it is difficult to see how such an exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction can be reconciled with established principles of
international law, 40 existing treaties to which the United States is a party, 4 '
36. See, Immenga/Mestmaicker, GWB-KoMMENTAR, 327-42 Abs. 2 § 98 (1981). See also,
FTC v. SGPM, 707 F.2d 1304, 1318.
37. See, Immenga/Mestmacker, id. at 321. But note that the European Commission, as well
as the European Court of Justice, regard substituted service upon a subsidiary within the
Common Market as constituting proper notice also as regards its non-Common Market parent
company. See, Gleiss and Hirsch, supra note 34 at 19-20.
38. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany relating to Mutual Cooperation regarding Restrictive Business Practices of September 11, 1976, reprintedat Doing Business in Europe, COMMON
MARKET REPORTER (CCH). para. 23,529.
39. See, generally, Moyer & Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The
History, Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW &POLICY ININT'L Bus.
1 (1983).
40. See, e.g., District Court at The Hague Judgement in Campagnie Europeenne des
Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V. of September 17, 1982 (English translation reprintedin
22 I.L.M. 66 (1983). Moyer & Mabry, supra note 39 at 108-16.
41. For example the Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United
States and a number of foreign countries all acknowledge the principle of international law that
companies constituted under the laws of a particular country have the nationality of that
country. See, e.g., Article XXV, para. 5, U.S.-German Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation of July 14, 1956, 7 UST 1839, TIAS 3593; Article XXIII, para. 3, U.S.-Netherlands
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of March 27, 1956.
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as well as American jurisprudence itself. 42 Rather, the issue is that the

United States appears to accord the general rules of international law less
value than other countries do.4 3 Under German law, for example, the
general rules of international law apply directly, supersede any conflicting
domestic law (except the Constitution itself), and cannot be overridden by
the legislature.an This is not so in the United States where an act of Congress
may expressly override principles of international law. 45
Thus, as the world grows smaller, the need to establish, and adhere to,
common rules increases. And while this creates additional responsibilities
for and between governments, it also calls for the courts to exercise their
role as creator, preserver, and enforcer of international law.

42. See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 102 S. Ct. 2374, 2379 note 11
(1982); and Bell & Howell : Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063, 1076
(E.D.N.Y. 1982).
43. The general rules of international law comprise the rules of the unwritten customary law
of the nations as well as the general principles of laws recognized by civilized nations. See,
Article 38, para. 1, lit. b and c, respectively, of the Statutes of the International Court of Justice,
reprinted and annotated at 12 DIOEST OF INT'L L. 1368.
44. Article 25 of the German Constitution. See, e.g., Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Klein, KOMMENTAR
ZUM GRUNDGESETZ, at Art. 25 (6th ed. 1983).
45. See, Moyer & Mabry, supra note 39, at 115.
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